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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated section 35-4-508(10).
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Did the Board of Review (the "Board") err by failing to impose upon

Bud F. Barela ("Barela") the burden to prove that he did not quit his employment and that he
did not refuse to accept a suitable offer of employment?
The standard of review is a correction of error standard. Savage Industries,
Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 811 P.2d 664 (Utah 1991); Utah Dept. of Admin. Serv. v.
Pub. Serv. Comm% 658 P.2d 601 (Utah 1983). The Board's determination of whether an
employee voluntarily left work or did not accept a suitable offer of work is affirmed only if
it is supported by substantial evidence. Lanier v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah, 694 P.2d 625,
628 (Utah 1985).
2.

Were the Board's factual findings and conclusions of law as to whether

Barela was terminated or voluntarily quit his employment, adequately supported by
substantial evidence?
The Board's determination of whether an employee voluntarily left work or did
not accept a suitable offer of work is affirmed only if it is supported by substantial evidence.
Lanier v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah, 694 P.2d 625, 628 (Utah 1985).
1

3.

Were the Board's factual findings and conclusions, based upon a

residuum of competent evidence, sufficient to sustain Barela's burden of proof, exclusive of
hearsay testimony?
The standard of review is a correction of error standard. Industrial Power
Contractors v. Industrial Comm'n, 832 P.2d 477 (Utah App. 1992); Tolman v. Salt Lake
County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23 (Utah App. 1991).
4.

Is Petitioner/Appellant C.R. England & Sons, Inc. ("England"), entitled

to a new hearing because the Board of Review failed to consider whether England's offer to
Barela to return to a driving position constitutes an offer of suitable work, and whether
Barela failed, without good cause, to properly accept the offer?
The standard of review is a correction of error standard. Tolman v. Salt Lake
County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23 (Utah App. 1991).

2

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Determinative Statues and Rules are:
1.

R562-5b-103, Utah Administrative Code, see Addendum 2.

2.

Utah Code Ann. § 35-4-405(l)(a) (formerly § 35-4-5(a)), see

Addendum 3.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.
England, a locally owned trucking company, relieved respondent Bud F.

Barela ("Barela") of his position as a driver trainer and invited him to return to his
previously held driver position. Barela claims his employment was terminated. England
asserts that Barela was never terminated from employment but was invited to work as a
driver after being released from his driver trainer position.
B.

Course of Proceedings.
On or about December 12, 1994, Barela applied for unemployment benefits

with the Utah Department of Employment Security ("DES"). (R. 2-4.) In response,
England contested Barela's claim on the basis that Barela was negligent in his driver trainer
job duties and on the basis that at the time of Barela's termination from his driver position,
he was invited to return to a higher paying driver position, which he had previously held.
(R. 5.) On or about January 5, 1995, the DES sent notice of its decision to award Barela
3

unemployment insurance benefits. (R. 10.) England appealed that decision (R. 11.), and on
February 6 & 7, 1995, the Honorable Kenneth A. Major, a DES Administrative Law Judge
("Judge Major"), conducted a hearing. (R. 34-111.)
On February 8, 1995, Judge Major issued his decision affirming the DES's
decision to award Barela benefits. (R. 112-117.) England appealed Judge Major's decision
to the Board. (R. 118-119.) On June 2, 1995, the Board, by majority, issued its decision
affirming Judge Major. (R. 130-134.) Board member Lawrence Disera, in dissent, found in
favor of England. (R. 132-133.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Barela was employed by England as a driver for approximately six

months, from December 1993 until June 1994. (R. 85, 113.)
2.

Barela was employed by England as a driver trainer for seven months

in 1994. (R. 85.)
3.

England Director of Driver Training, Gary Thompson ("Thompson")

testified during the DES hearing that during his December 1, 1994 termination meeting with
Barela, he told Barela he would be released from his responsibilities as a driver trainer and
that he would be asked to take another job driving for England. (R. 19, 44, 83.)
4.

Thompson's notes contemporaneous to his December 1, 1994 meeting

with Barela, titled "Comment Sheet," are consistent with his testimony. Thompson's notes
4

state additionally that Thompson (1) told Barela he was free to work for any other England
department and (2) suggested that Barela should contact dispatch and Director of Operations,
Kent Williams to join a truck fleet. (R. 7-8, 38, 53, 55-56, 58.)1
5.

Thompson testified that he directed Barela to speak to Kent Williams,

who then was England's Director of Operations, in order to work as an England driver. (R.
83.)
6.

Barela's direct supervisor Ernie Torres ("Torres") testified that he also

told Barela that he was going to be relieved of his driver trainer duties, but that he would
have the option to drive for England locally or over the road. (R. 71, 73-74. 106-107.)
7.

Torres also testified that driver positions were always open and Barela

could determine his driving options by going in to talk to a local or an over-the-road
dispatcher. (R. 74, 106.)
8.

Thompson testified that fleet managers would not call Barela to drive

for them unless Barela had told the fleet managers he was available and willing to drive. (R.
106.)

1

For clarity, a one-page typed version of Thompson's two-page "Comment Sheet," his notes
taken contemporaneously to the December 1, 1994 Thompson/Barela meeting, is included as
Addendum 1.
5

9.

Torres testified that drivers do not need to be told whom they should

contact to receive work as drivers. (R. 107.)
10.

Thompson testified that England's required termination procedures

include completing a termination evaluation form. (R. 104.) A termination evaluation form
was never created for Barela. Id.
11.

Thompson also testified that if he had terminated Barela's employment,

he would have given Barela his paycheck at the time of the termination. Id. Instead,
Thompson paid Barela the following week because he assumed Barela was still an England
employee. Id.
12.„

Thompson testified that even at the time of the DES hearing, Barela

was on the computer system as an active driver and that Barela could immediately return to
work as a driver. (R. 104.)
13.

Kathleen Barela, Barela's spouse, was also employed by England and

had access to the computer "44 screen" that would indicate that Barela was considered by
England to be an active driver. (R. 105.)
14.

Barela testified that he did not receive a termination form or notice.

15.

Barela testified that some time after he was released from the driver

(R. 96.)

trainer position, Torres asked him why he was not driving for England. (R. 111.)
6

16.

In affirming the decision of Judge Major, the Board majority (two of

three members) accepted and adopted in full Judge Major's factual findings and conclusions
of law. (R. 130-132.)
17.

The Board also made the following findings of fact based exclusively

upon the testimony of Kathleen Barela:
a.

Kathleen had spoken to her boss, Kent Williams, the England

Director of Operations, who told her (1) he did not know Barela had been terminated, and
(2) he had not been contacted by the training department. (R. 131.)
b.

On the day Barela learned he would no longer be a driver

trainer from Thompson, Kathleen asked Barela what had happened but he was too upset to
tell her then. (R. 131.)
Based upon those pieces of Kathleen Barela's testimony, the Board states: "If
the claimant had understood he could return to his position as a driver it seems likely he
would have told his wife that at the time of their conversation." (R. 131.)
18-

The only other Board findings are as follows:
a.

Without a specific record reference, the Board states: "The

record shows the claimant and his wife made it known to the employer that the claimant
believed he had been terminated." (R. 131.)

7

b.

The Board also states: "If it was the employer's intent to have

the claimant return to work as a driver, it seems strange that immediately upon learning that
the claimant believed he had been terminated, no one bothered to call him to correct his
'misunderstanding' for nearly three months." (R. 131.)
19.

Board member Lawrence Disera made the following conclusions in

dissent of the Board's decision:
I conclude the claimant was offered the opportunity to return to
his former position as a truck driver. He declined the offer
because he considered it to be a demotion. Considering the
short duration of his job as a driver's trainer, and absent any
showing that he would have suffered a significant reduction in
pay, I conclude that the offer to allow the claimant to return to
his former position as a driver to be "an offer of suitable new
work," especially where his performance as a trainer was not
acceptable to the employer.
(R. 132-133.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Board's decision is flawed and should be reversed because it did not
impose upon Barela the burden to prove that he did not quit his employment or that he did
not refuse to accept a suitable offer of employment. The Board did not address Barela's
burden of proof and it adopted similarly flawed findings and conclusions of Judge Major,
who also failed to impose upon Barela the appropriate burden of proof.

8

Additionally, the Board's findings and conclusions were not based upon a
residuum of legally competent evidence, nor were they based upon substantial evidence, all
of which was necessary for the Board to determine if an employee voluntarily left
employment or refused to accept a suitable employment offer.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE BOARD FAILED TO IMPOSE UPON BARELA THE BURDEN TO PROVE BY
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT HE DID NOT QUIT HIS EMPLOYMENT.
The Board's factual findings and legal conclusions were reached in error,
including its adoption of Judge Major's findings and conclusions, because the Board failed to
impose the burden upon Barela to prove whether he quit or was discharged. Lanier v.
Industrial Comm'n of Utah, 694 P.2d 625, 628 (Utah 1985). The Board and Judge Major
have confused this burden with an employer's burden to establish facts concerning an
undisputed discharge. See R562-5b-103, Utah Administrative Code, at Addendum 2.
In Lanier v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah, 694 P.2d 625 (Utah 1985), the Utah
Supreme Court stated: "The burden of proof in unemployment compensation proceedings is
on the claimant to establish eligibility for benefits. In the context of this case, this burden
required plaintiff to show he did not leave work voluntarily." Id. at 628. The Board

9

recognized that the issue in this case, like Lanier\ is whether the claimant was discharged or
left work voluntarily without good cause. (R. 131.) See Utah Code Ann. § 35-4-405(1 )(a)
(formerly § 35-4-5(a)), at Addendum 3.
The Board's decision incorrectly placed the burden of proof on England.
Neither the Board's decision nor Judge Major's decision reflect or even mention any burden
of proof imposed upon the claimant. Judge Major's limited findings on the issue indicate
that he placed the burden of proof upon England:
The employer has the burden to demonstrate the three elements
of just cause are present in the claimant's discharge.

The [England Director of Training] alleges that claimant was not
fired but removed from his training position and the claimant
failed to continue as a truck driver for the employer. The
Tribunal does not find the preponderance of evidence supports
this position.
(R. 115-116.) Judge Major incorrectly applied the law, by requiring England to support its
position by a preponderance of the evidence.
The Board's Decision Was Not Based Upon Substantial Evidence,
The Board of Review relies primarily upon the testimony of Kathleen Barela to affirm the
Administrative Law Judge's factual findings. (R. 131-132.) In support of its decision, the
Board refers to several facts established only by the hearsay testimony of Barela's wife,

10

including her testimony of her discussions with England Director of Operation, Kent
Williams, (R. 131) and her testimony concerning statements Barela made to her and those he
allegedly failed to make to her. (R. 131.) Without reference or explanation, the Board
concludes:
The record shows the claimant and his wife made it known to
the employer that the claimant believed he had been terminated.
If it was the employer's intent to have the claimant return to
work as a driver, it seems strange that immediately upon
learning that the claimant believed he had been terminated, no
one bothered to call him to correct his 'misunderstanding' for
nearly three months.
(R. 131.) Presumably, the Board bases this conclusion on the testimony of Barela's wife,
Kathleen. Hers is the only testimony in the record of conversations about Barela's
employment status after he had been terminated from the trainer position. There is no other
testimony about whether or when anyone at England allegedly knew Barela believed he had
been terminated from England employment.
At the administrative hearing, Kathleen Barela testified: "I was unaware of
England making any contacts with my husband and in fact, when I spoke - he referenced
Kent -- Kent Williams, I spoke to Kent Williams about my husband and Kent Williams was
taken, he was shocked. He had no idea my husband had been terminated. He hadn't been
contacted by the Training Department." (R. 100-101.) Judge Major's findings of fact on
this point are limited to the following:
11

The claimant met with the director who, during the discussion,
informed the claimant he was discharged. The claimant left the
meeting and immediately went to his wife's desk and asked for
the keys to their personal vehicle. She asked why and he
responded that the director had just fired him.
(R. 113.)
Judge Major did make an all-important finding of fact that Barela was told "he
would be removed from training in two weeks and that he could return to driving."
(R. 113.) The Board's only other pertinent factual findings are (1) that Barela was not
contacted by England and given a driving assignment and (2) Barela did not make his routine
weekend driving run. Those findings are refuted by England's substantial and legally
competent evidence.
At the time Barela was relieved of his trainer position, he was told by
Thompson and by Torres, on separate occasions, that he should contact England dispatchers,
fleet managers, or Kent Williams, Director of Operations, for driving work. (R. 7-8, 53,
71, 73-74, 106-107.) Torres also testified that a driver would not have to be told to whom
he should speak to receive work; drivers know they need to make themselves available for
work (R. 106), (R. 107); and Thompson testified that drivers could receive work from any
fleet manager. (R. 106-107.) It was Barela's obligation to make himself available to work
as a driver, including his typical weekend driving work. Id.
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Thompson testified, and his notes taken contemporaneously with Barela's loss
of his driver position, establish that Barela's employment with England was not terminated
and that it was Barela's responsibility to report to work as a driver. (R. 19, 44, 83, 106,
Addendum "1.") The testimony of Torres, substantiates those two points. (R. 71, 73-74,
106-107.) Because Barela was distraught and apparently angry at losing his driver position,
he had no intention of returning to work. As late as February, 1994, Barela refused to work
as an England driver. (R. 123.)
Barela's burden to prove that he did not quit his employment must be based
upon substantive evidence. Lanier v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah, 694 P.2d 625, 628 (Utah
1985). In Albertsons, Inc. v. Dept. of Employment Sec, 854 P.2d 570 (Utah App. 1993),
this Court stated: "In applying the substantial evidence test, we review the 'whole record'
before the court, and consider both evidence that supports the Board's findings and evidence
that fairly detracts from them." Id. at 574, quoting Department of Air Force v. Swider, 824
P.2d 448, 451 (Utah App. 1991). Based upon a review of the record on appeal, this Court
should reverse the Board's decision on the basis that it failed to place the burden of proof
upon Barela, and because there is not substantial evidence to support the Board's conclusion
that he did not quit his employment at England. An alternative remedy would be to remand
the matter to require the Board to review England's appeal based upon the imposition of the
proper burdens of proof on Barela. The Board should be required to consider on remand
13

whether England's offer to Barela to return to a driving position constitutes an offer of
suitable work, and whether Barela failed, without good cause, to properly accept the offer.
POINT H
THE BOARD'S DECISION IS IMPROPERLY BASED UPON
HEARSAY EVIDENCE.
This Court has, on several occasions, repeated the rule that findings of fact
cannot be based exclusively on hearsay evidence, but must be supported by a residuum of
legally competent evidence. Industrial Power Contractors, v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah,
832 P.2d 477, 478-79 (Utah App. 1992); Wagstaffv. Dept. of Employment Sec, 826 P.2d
1069, 1072 (Utah App. 1992); Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 32-33
(Utah App. 1991). Additionally, issues regarding admissibility of evidence should have
been, but were not addressed by the Board. See Tolman, at 32. The residuum rule requires
this reviewing Court to set aside all legally inadmissible evidence relied upon by the Board to
determine if there remains a residuum of legally competent evidence to support its findings.
832 P.2d at 479; 818 P.2d at 32-33. After setting aside the hearsay testimony of Kathleen
Barela, there is not a residuum of legally competent evidence sufficient to establish Barela's
eligibility for benefits.
Although there is little Utah appellate court opinion to define what constitutes
residuum evidence, it is reasonable to conclude that a residuum of legally competent
14

evidence is not merely a residue of evidence, but must be evidence capable of sustaining the
agency's factual findings and legal conclusions. See Williams v. Schwendiman, 740 P.2d
1354, 1357 (Utah App. 1987). To allow agencies to make findings and conclusions only
upon a any trace of non-hearsay evidence would contravene the residuum rule's purpose, to
avoid arbitrary decisions. The Board's findings in this case are arbitrary because even if
deemed to be based upon some slight residuum of evidence they are only based upon a trace
of evidence that is insufficient to sustain its decision.
CONCLUSION
England respectfully requests, based upon the foregoing, that this Court
reverse the decision of the Board and conclude (1) that Barela did not sustain his burden to
prove with substantial evidence that he did not quit his employment, and (2) that there is not
a residuum of evidence to sustain the Board's Decision. In the alternative, England requests
that the matter be remanded for a determination of (1) whether Barela quit his employment
and (2) whether the England offer was an offer of suitable new work, based upon the
appropriate standards and burdens of proof.
DATED this 18th

day of October, 1995.
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON

Nathan R. Hyde
tj
Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellant
C.R. England & Sons, Inc.
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ADDENDA
Addendum 1:

Comment Sheet of Gary Thompson.

Addendum 2:

R562-5b-103, Utah Administrative Code.

Addendum 3:

Utah Code Ann. § 35-4-405(l)(a) (formerly § 35-4-5(a)).

ADDENDUM 1

COMMENT SHEET
Name: Gary Thompson
Date: December 1, 1994
Name: Bud Barela
RespondentComments:
I contacted Ernie Torrez at home last night to set up a meeting with Bud Barella
for this morning.
Joe Beeson explained to me that Bud has stopped by his office to express his
total disgust for the decision that had been made. We, Ernie Torrez, Joe Beeson, and
I Gary Thompson, had decided to release Bud from his Training Truck position. The
decision was made in response to a written complaint that was received from a school
Trainee by the Classroom Instructor. It was then forwarded to Joe Beeson.
In my discussion with Bud this morning I explained that we didn't think it was a
good idea to continue our relationship any further.
We had originally decided that we would give him two weeks notice of
separation. This was mainly determined so that Bud could get established into one of
our truck fleets, with as little of confusion as possible.
When Joe Beeson said that Bud was not going to accept the conditions of
separation I got involved.
Joe said that Bud was angry and he feared aggression.
I told Bud that his service was no longer needed and that he was free to work
for any other department in the company. That his skills as an Instructor were poor at
best.
He said he felt I was personally out to get him.
I said that was not the case. That his performance was unacceptable. I asked
him if it was a fact that he read the paper while instructing student drivers.
He said yes, but at no time was there any danger.
I told him that in fact I had a comment from a third party that his statement was
not perceived that way. (See Joe Bearden comment)
I told him that his actions in the las while was a serious liability.
The people he was training didn't pass, due to his instruction.
I reminded him that he was warned less than 1 month ago that his attitude
towards his job was suffering and that he was told then that 1 more situation and he
would be replaced.
He said that he didn't remember that. His supervisor never gave him anything.
I told him it didn't matter that this was serious enough that I, we felt that he was
negligent in his duties as an Instructor. These people paid to learn.
He wanted to continue a debate on the issue and I stopped the debate by
saying that he needed the contact dispatch.
He said who do you want me to see?
I said, "Talk to Kent Williams about getting into a fleet."
He wanted to argue and escalate the situation and I asked him to leave my
office. Joe Beeson last evening expressed his concern about Bud becoming
aggressive. I didn't want this to escalate into a situation of anger.
I said again that I was through and he could leave.
gary\documents\memo\bubb mem
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ADDENDUM 2
R562-5b-103, Utah Administrative Code
(1) In a discharge, the employer initiates the separation and is the primary source of
information with regard to the reasons for the dismissal. The employer has the burden of
proof which is the responsibility to establish the facts resulting in the discharge. The
employer is required by Subsection 35-4-1 l(7)(a) to keep accurate records and to provide
correct information to the Department for proper administration of the Act. Although th
employer has the burden to establish just cause for the discharge, if sufficient facts are
obtained from the claimant, a decision will be made based on the information available. The
failure of one party to provide information does not necessarily result in a ruling favorable to
the other party.
(2)
All interested parties have the right to give rebuttal to information contrary to
the interests of that party.

ADDENDUM 3
Utah Code Ann. § 35-4-405(l)(a)
For the week in which the claimant left work voluntarily without good cause, if so
found by the commission, and for each week thereafter until the claimant has performed
services in bona fide, covered employment and earned wages for those services equal to at
least six times the claimant's weekly benefit amount.

